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Abstract 
Subjectivity plays a role in the design and analysis of every clinical 
trial. I discuss its present role (for example, in the context of analyzing at 
haphazard times as data accumulate), and suggest ways that subjectivity could be 
incorporated in an explicit way and in a variety of settings. One such setting 
is a trial sponsored by a pharmaceutical company in which accumulating data can 
be used to update previously available (subjective) information. Another is in 
planning and analyzing trials which use adaptive (or sequential) treatment 
assignment schemes. Another is in planning and analyzing an ethical clinical 
trial, one in which each patient receives the treatment best suited to him or 
her. 
Introduction 
Most biostatisticians involved in clinical trials strive to ensure that a 
trial's design, conduct, and analysis are objective. This goal is 
unattainable: objectivity is impossible in science generally. I don't want to 
get too deeply into philosophical issues so I won't expand on this. Instead, 
I'll tell you a few of the ways that subjectivity creeps surreptitiously into 
current clinical trials, and then I'll focus on the advantages of recognizing 
the presence of subjectivity and show how it can be exploited to best accomplish 
the purpose of the trial. 
The design of a clinical trial should depend on its purpose. Generally 
speaking, there is only one legitimate reason to conduct a clinical trial: to 
deliver effective medical treatment. The question is, to whom? There are 
essentially two answers: 
• Patients in the trial, and 
• Patients who are treated outside the context of the trial based on 
information learned during the trial.· 
Randomized clinical trials (RCTs) are consistent with the second to an 
extent, but they address the first only in that investigators will stop a trial 
should it become sufficiently clear that patients in the trial are being treated 
badly. But the trial continues when there are suggestions in that direction 
-without being "sufficiently clear" that some patients are being treated badly. 
On the other hand, the trial may end when the evidence does not begin to suggest 
which treatment is best. 
Sample sizes for RCTs are calculated on the basis of power considerations (a 
process which, incidentally, is far from being objective). RCTs have inflexible 
designs, most with treatment allocation balanced among the constituent 
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treatments. Neither of these aspects has much to do with delivering good 
medicine--whether to patients in or out of the trial. 
RCTs are saddled with the straightjacket of classical statistics. The 
classical design of clinical trials is tied to the eventual analysis. This 
results in a very inflexible view of design. The design must be specified 
completely in advance, including what analyses will be done and when they will 
be done; changes are formally impossible and in practice require excuses and 
approximate analyses, with little ability to assess the accuracy of the 
approximations. 
Inflexibility of the Classical Approach 
One of the most objectionable aspects of the classical approach is that it 
gives essentially the same prescription for every malady. Consider two 
extremes. The first is coronary bypass surgery compared in a clinical trial 
with a treatment combination consisting of a regimented diet, exercise and 
drugs. The second is an experimental drug compared with placebo in the 
treatment of a rare form of cancer (say there are only 100 new patients in the 
U.S. per year). In the first setting there are millions of people who could 
benefit from the results of the trial; while in the second setting, all the 
patients in the U.S. who contract the disease in the next several years 
(depending on n) will be in the trial. (The patient is told that the only 
possibility of receiving the "new treatment" is to participate in the trial.) 
Assume in both cases that we're interested in the same end point, say five-year 
survival. Then the same power calculations apply for both. Suppose we find the 
required sample size to be n - 400. In the first setting, 200 patients are 
randomly assigned to surgery and the other 200 to the diet/exercise program; in 
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the second, 200 are randomly assigned to drug and the remaining 200 to placebo. 
There are at least two reasons that these settings should not be dealt with 
the same. First, the information gained from the trials will have very 
different impacts. What is learned in the first setting will apply to millions, 
and so there is much to be gained (in terms of good medical treatment for these 
millions) from knowing which is the better therapy. But what is learned in the 
second will apply to very few patients. Actually, it may apply to n2 patients: 
the trial will last about four years, and new, obviously superio~ treatments may 
well be discovered during that time. In the interim, as many as 200 patients 
may be treated with an inferior treatment for no worthwhile purpose. 
Statistical power is obtained at the expense of effective treatment of some of 
the patients in the trial; in some cases it may be worth the expense, and in 
others not. 
The second reason for dealing with the two settings differently is· that the 
available information is so different. Much is known concerning the 
effectiveness of coronary bypass surgery and of diet/exercise. In particular, 
if one is better than the other (in a population of patients who are candidates 
for coronary bypasses), it is not markedly better. But little is known 
concerning the effectiveness of a new drug in the treatment of a rare disease. 
It is conceivably very effective, but it might be distinctly worse than no 
treatment. So perhaps n - 1000 may be required in the first case while n - 10 
or 20 is sufficient in the rare disease setting; or better, in both cases the 
data might be examined continuously with no particular trial size in mind! 
(I'll return to this latter possibility later.) 
Small trials have small power: they are able to reject the null hypothesis 
of no difference with high probability only if one treatment is much better than 
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the other. Classical statisticians complain about trials too small to have a 
reasonable "chance of detecting differences of therapeutic value" (Mosteller, 
Gilbert and McPeek, 1983). They contend that many actual trials are too small 
to be worthwhile. Some even believe that it is unethical to conduct a small 
trial since some of the patients will be exposed to inferior treatment with 
little hope of rejecting a false null hypothesis. This is true, but it's not 
the point. Such a piecemeal approach allows clinicians to digest the 
information currently available and perhaps decide that further investigation is 
inappropriate--the experimental treatment may be clearly bad or clearly good. 
Classical statisticians cannot advocate such an approach because the inverted 
nature of classical inference makes it woefully inept at combining results from 
different trials--called meta-analysis by some. Indeed, for a formally correct 
classical analysis of multiple trials, all the trials have to be designed in 
advance of the first trial, complete with rules for stopping, initiating other 
trials, etc. This is obviously impossible, and so, strictiy speaking, classical 
meta-analysis is impossible. 
In my opinion, small trials are the rule in medicine today because the 
associated flexibility is so important to clinicians; they bypass statistics as 
they know it, with its obscure p-values, in favor of the important inferences: 
Does this drug work?, Is drug A better than drug B for Mr. Smith?, etc. They 
make these inferences in an informal, subjective way. (An unfortunate 
consequence is that they come to view statistics as data analysis and of little 
help in making medical decisions.) 
Classical Interim Analysis 
From the point of view of classical statistics, a piecemeal approach is 
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possible in a single trial by splitting the trial into subgroups of patients, 
provided the options and intentions of the investigator are completely specified 
in advance. Using a "group sequential" approach, the available data are 
analyzed at various times during the course of the trial. In Berry (1985, 
1987a), I argue against such an approach in very strong terms. The approach 
harbors a dangerous kind of subjectivity. For example, consider two 
investigators: A plans interim analyses and B plans none (or says he planned 
none!). They get identical data. It turns out that B can claim statistical 
significance, but, because she looked at the data with the possibility of early 
stopping, A cannot. To avoid A's dilemma, classical statisticians warn 
investigators not to look at accumulating data because doing so endangers the 
ability to draw conclusions--sounds crazy! 
What about the investigator who does not plan interim analyses but makes 
them nonetheless, looking at the accumulating data periodically with the 
possibility of stopping? Strictly speaking, no classical inferences are 
possible. For example, consider p-values. A p-value is the probability of a 
result more extreme than that observed. But the investigator has no hope of 
being able to say accurately what results would have been more extreme at 
earlier looks and also at subsequent looks that never took place, as well as 
when they were to take place.· In reality, few investigators have even the 
vaguest notion that merely looking at the data can affect inferences drawn. 
Most feel that looking is necessary in case the interim results indicate that 
the trial should be halted or modified, and that not looking is unethical. 
(Using logic that completely escapes me, some doctors and statisticians argue 
that investigators should not look at interim data because they will face an 
ethical dilemma should one of the treatments appear to be better than the other. 
5 
If there are possible data for which continuing the trial would be unethical, 
then not looking seems unethical: Would it not be unethical for a doctor to 
refuse to read a medical report that might contain vital information for the 
treatment of a patient?) 
The Flexibility of the Bayesian Approach 
Clinicians usually have information that can help design a clinical trial. 
This information can be used in a completely explicit way to design a trial that 
effectively treats patients in or outside the trial, or both. What is required 
is that the clinicians quantify their information into probability distributions 
of the various unknown parameters. (There are numerous published methods which 
aid in doing this.) These parameters include the degrees of effectiveness of 
the various drugs and the size of the patient population that will benefit from 
knowledge gained during the trial. (I want to stress that the clinicians do not 
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have to know or to think they know these parameters, they need only be able to 
convey the information they have, even if it's limited.) 
Assessing probability distributions of the various parameters means that 
these can be updated at any time using Bayes's theorem. There are two appealing 
aspects of this approach that are in stark contrast with the classical approach. 
First, probability statements are direct. For example, while a p-value is the 
probability of-results as or more extreme than those observed assuming the null 
hypothesis, a Bayesian approach allows one to give the probability that the null 
hypothesis is true given the data. Secondly, these direct probability 
statements do not depend on.the trial's design. As such they can be calculated 
at any time and for any purpose, even to determine the future course of the 
trial! I turn to an extreme example of this. 
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Effective Treatment for Patients in the Trial 
Consider a trial involving two treatments for a rare disease. All patients 
who contract this disease in the next several years are to be entered into the 
study. Say they nwnber n. I shall assume for convenience that n is known, but 
it need not be. Since all patients with the disease are in the trial, the 
objective is to treat these n as effectively as possible. Assume that responses 
are success-failure and that each patient responds before the next patient is to 
be treated. (Eick (1985) considers the more realistic setting in which a 
patient's response is a survival time and so at any time only partial 
information may be available from previously treated patients.) 
The treatment assigned to patient i is allowed to depend on the information 
available at the time of treatment; this information includes the responses of 
patients 1, 2, ... , i-1. (Obviously, this information is available only if the 
earlier patients have responded.) A treatment assignment strategy is a sequence 
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of n A's and B's such that the i symbol (indicating the treatment used f~r 
patient i) can depend on the first i-1 treatment assignments and responses. 
Each treatment assignment strategy has an associated expected number of 
successes among then patients. A strategy which maximizes that expected number 
of successes can be found via backward induction (Berry and Fristedt 1985). 
Quite generally, an RCT is an unsatisfactory solution of this problem. 
Effective Treatment for Patients Outside the Trial 
Now let's leave the rare-disease setting and suppose that there are patients 
with the condition in question outside the trial. Suppose that N is the number 
of patients with the disease who are in the trial or who will be given the 
treatment found to be best among those in the trial. This number is obviously 
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unknown, and assessing its distribution is no mean task, but in practice only a 
rough estimate is required. Suppose n of the N patients are in the trial. 
After then patients in the trial respond, the remaining N-n will be assigned 
the treatment which has the greater probability of success at the end of the 
trial. Again the problem is a bandit and can be solved using backward 
induction. With these assumptions, Berry and Eick (1987) find the optimal 
strategy for various n and N and compare it with other assignment strategies, 
including RCTs, on the basis of expected number of successes lost as a function 
of the (unknown) probabilities of success. Summarizing the results, an RCT is 
quite unsatisfactory when N is small, but if N is at least moderately large, an 
RCT, while not optimal, is a very reasonable solution. 
Ethical Clinical Trials 
Is there such a thing? Not in the context of a classical approach to 
statistics. But they are quite possible in the Bayesian approach. I'll 
describe one way that an ethical trial can be conducted (see ~erry (1987b) for a 
critical discussion, and technical details). You'll have many reservations; 
those related to difficulties in making classical inferences such asp-values do 
not concern me. 
To be specific consider a trial involving breast cancer. There are at least 
five types of therapy available, though they have many variants and certain 
combinations are possible: mastectomy, lumpectomy, chemotherapy, radiation, and 
no treatment. A patient is admitted to the trial. The clinician evaluates her 
condition and considers other relevant information (for example, the patient's 
age and general state of health). The clinician assesses the patient's 
prognosis for each available therapy and combination thereof. These assessments 
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are based on all the information available to the clinician: data concerning the 
various therapies published in the literature and in the clinician's experience, 
including the current trial!, the patient's condition, etc. These assessments 
are subjective and are modified continually (or as often as possible) using 
Bayes's theorem. 
The clinician informs the patient of these assessments for each possible 
combination of therapy. The patient is given complete information: probability 
of remission (for various lengths of time), probabilities of various side 
effects and adverse experiences, cosmetic consequences, the patient's 
responsibilities, inconveniences, costs, etc. In addition, the patient can be 
told the various components of the clinician's probabilities; for example, the 
proportions of the clinician's own patients similar to the current patient who 
are still in remission. The only thing she is not given is the clinician's 
recommendation of treatment. Armed with all this information the patient 
chooses her therapy. 
The patients are followed as in current trials. Unlike many current trials 
the patient can change her mind based on the course of.her disease, new data 
that have come to light, etc., and opt for a modification of her therapy. The 
data base for the trial is kept current to enable informed later treatment. 
The results can be published at any time, even periodically. Classical 
statistical inferences are impossible. But Bayesian posterior probability 
distributions can be published (along with the sufficient statistics to separate 
out the "subjective" part of these distributions); there is never a penalty for 
interim analysis in the Bayesian approach--the data are taken at face value. In 
addition, the clinician can calculate and publish such quantities as the 
posterior probability ("current" is a better modifier because these 
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probabilities are constantly subject to change) that mastectomy+ chemotherapy+ 
radiation, for example, is better than no treatment for a typical patient. 
Perhaps your biggest objection at this point is that treatment allocation is 
bound to be unbalanced since similar patients will tend to select the same 
treatment. So the ability to make certain inferences can be severely limited. 
There's no arguing with this. It is not possible to have a trial that is both 
ethical and guaranteed to be balanced. Still, there can be a substantial amount 
of evidence available even with great imbalance. For example, suppose there are 
106 patients in a trial. These patients were regarded as exchangeable before 
treatment--they all had the same values of any covariates, for example. During 
the course of the trial the data seem to suggest that treatment A is better than 
Band so it is chosen by most of the patients: 98 to 8. It turns out that there 
are 93 successes of the 98 on A and 3 successes of the 8 on B. Then the 
probability that Bis better than A (assuming independent uniform priors on the 
two probabilities of success) is only 0.00002. 
There are complications that will arise in any real trial. I address many 
of these in Berry (1987b). My point here is that ethical trials are possible by 
considering subjectivity in a completely explicit way. 
A Pharmaceutical Company Decision Problem 
Until now, I've been discussing clinical trial design from the point of view 
of treating patients effectively; in particular, I've ignored monetary 
considerations. I now turn to a setting in which monetary considerations are 
primary, namely, planning a drug development program for a pharmaceutical 
company. I want to make it clear, however, that maximizing profit for 
pharmaceutical companies is not inconsistent with delivering good medicine. 
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Only a very short-sighted company would market a drug it knows to be ineffective 
or unsafe. A company that markets an ineffective drug risks losing marketing 
and other developmental costs; in this age of litigation, marketing an unsafe 
drug risks being forced into bankruptcy. 
Consider a phamaceutical company that is developing an experimental drug. 
It has spent a great deal of money on the drug and has to decide whether to 
spend still more. If the company continues development and the evidence shows 
that the drug is safe and effective, then it will eventually try to obtain 
regulatory approval for marketing the drug. Even if it succeeds in marketing 
the drug, it may actually lose money, depending on the drug's effectiveness (and 
side effects). If the company stops development then, of course, it will lose 
whatever profit~ were possible. The question is, As a function of current 
information, should the company continue or stop development? 
I'll address this question from three points of view: (1) the status quo, 
(2) using classical statistics, and (3) using subjectivity in a Bayesian 
approach. As to (1), such decisions are usually made as follows. A team headed 
by a company executive (usually an M.D.) uses _an approach roughly similar to 
(3), but in a very informal way, a way filled with perils. They examine the 
available information, assess the chances of regulatory agency approval, and 
evaluate the market. The executive makes the final decision with input from the 
team. There are statisticians on the team but they play a rather minor role in 
the decision process. The greatest peril in this process is what business 
analysts call entrapment: the executive has made previous decisions to continue 
development, so to stop development now is to admit that those previous 
decisions were wrong. The executive is "trapped" and, according to Staw (1981), 
is much less likely ~o change course than would someone who was not previously 
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involved. 
I can dispose of (2) even more quickly. Statisticians in the pharmaceutical 
industry in the U.S. are mainly non-Bayesians. The reason statisticians don't 
have much input under the status quo is that classical statistics simply cannot 
address questions such as, How likely is it that the drug is ineffective? A 
decision maker must be able to answer this and similar questions. Such 
questions require a subjective interpretation of probability. 
I'll devote the rest of my discussion of this problem to a Bayesian 
approach. Much of what I say is along the lines of the analysis in Berry and Ho 
(1987). Assume that the experimental drug is being compared with a control in a 
clinical trial. The trial has a parallel design with about the same number of 
patients receiving drug as receive control. The trial's costs are assumed to be 
proportional to the number of patients involved. The setup is similar to the 
classical problem of interim analysis. The data are to be examined pe£iodically 
during the course of the trial. (More generally, the "trial" can be viewed as a 
drug development program comprising various trials, possibly taking place 
concurrently. In this case the periodic examinations can occur during trials or 
between trials.) 
At these periodic analyses, the question the pharmaceutical company 
addresses is: Should it continue or stop the trial? If the interim results are 
very positive then the trial and drug development will continue. But if the 
interim results are sufficiently negative then the trial and further development 
will cease. 
The company carries on a collate·ral process of statistical analysis for 
convincing the regulatory authorities that the drug is safe and effective; at 
least in the United States, this analysis has to be classical. The maximal 
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trial size is selected to be convincing to the authorities. Premature stopping 
can occur for negative results but not for positive results. So the appropriate 
adjustment in one-sided P-values is negligible (Ho, 1986), and is downward in 
any case. 
The company's objective is to maximize profit. Use 6 to denote the average 
advantage of the drug over control. The expected profits from marketing the 
drug depend on 6. The company assesses this functional dependence, averaging 
over any unknown parameters. The initial (subjective) distribution of 6 is also 
assessed. 
Suppose the total number of analyses is k. (The only reasons for not 
analyzing after each patient responds are logistical and not statistical.) At 
the final analysis the decision will be made whether to pursue marketing, and at 
the k-1 interim analyses the decision will be made whether to continue. Each 
period includes 2n patients, non the experimental drug and non control. A 
particular model for the responses is assumed, such as normally distributed with 
known variance. 
This is a typical problem in dynamic programming. We calculate for what 
data the decision to market is optimal at the final analysis. We do this by 
comparing the profit from marketing averaged with respect to the posterior 
distribution of G, with the expected profit from stopping (we can ignore sunken 
costs). The maximal expected profit for each datum is then the greater of these 
two quantities. Then we back up to the penultimate analysis time, calculate the 
predictive distribution of the future data given the present, and evaluate the 
expect profit from continuing (including -2n in sample costs). If the expected 
profit from continuing is greater than that of stopping then it is optimal to 
continue if we ever find ourselves with these data, and we would stop otherwise. 
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Proceeding backward in this way we pass through each analysis time and end 
up at the first one. We then know the optimal decision (stop or continue) at 
each analysis time and for all possible data. In particular, we know whether it 
is optimal to start the trial. 
Conclusion 
I have shown several settings in which the flexibility gained by explicitly 
using subjectivity allows for better fulfilling the aims of clinical trials. 
But my greater message is to think hard about the purposes of the clinical trial 
during the design phase. Who is going to be harmed by your design and who is 
going to be helped--is the sacrifice warranted? The first constructive thing 
for you to do is to throw out your tables of power vs. sample size! 
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